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ABSTRACT 
 
Building on the literature on low IP regimes, this paper develops a multi-
model governance perspective for copyright research. Qualitative studies 
have shown that, in both low IP sectors and in heavily regulated sectors,   
creatives develop their own sets of rules, assumptions and routines that 
delineate accepted and objectionable practices. While there is empirical 
evidence, we still lack a theoretical underpinning to understand and inves-
tigate these phenomena within a systematic and comparative framework. 
This paper develops a conceptual framework based on sociological institu-
tionalism (SI). SI provides the theoretical basis for showing that mutually 
related rights and obligations, and the distinctions between right and 
wrong, possible and impossible actions are not only constituted by law but 
also by normative orientations and cognitive framings. This paper suggests 
a framework with four modes of copyright governance: (1) A regulative 
dimension, addressing the provision and enforcement of formal rules, laws, 
court decisions, terms of services; (2) a normative dimension, investigating 
the prevalent assumptions about legitimate and illegitimate behavior in a 
specific community or sector; (3) a discursive dimension, addressing the 
framings and debates on creativity, authorship, and originality; and (4) a 
technological dimension that investigates the embodiment of affordances 
and rules in infrastructures, devices, and algorithms relevant to creative 
work. Thus, when seeking to understand the framing and control of creative 
practives there is always more than law. These frames may align with legal 
provisions, but in many cases they do not. The paper applies this framework 
to existing studies on the governance creative production and dissemina-
tion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When creatives talk about their work, they rarely talk about copy-
right or trademarks. Routines of production, sources of inspiration and col-
laborations with colleagues and coworkers figure prominently among their 
narratives of their own work – but not the legal framing.1 Yet, the copyright 
regulation discourse routinely assumes that legal measures are constitutive 
for creative production: if there is no legal protection for creative works, we 
assume, creatives will not be able to reap the benefits. In this situation, crea-
                                                                                                                       
1. See, among others, JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, 
AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2014) and LAURA J. MURRAY, TINA S. PIPER & 
KIRSTY ROBERTSON, PUTTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE (2014). 
2017] There's Always More than Law! 3 
tives would lack incentives to create new works in the first place, with the 
result that they would not innovate at all.  
This great discrepancy between the dominant copyright discourse 
and creators’ own accounts presents a challenge for copyright research. The 
normative and highly politicized policy debate of the last two decades has 
paid rather little attention to the concrete practices of cultural production 
and their commercial exploitation.2 But in recent years, research from mul-
tiple perspectives has increasingly empirically investigated how copyright 
unleashes its actual effects in the domains of culture and economy,which 
socially desirable actions it enables and which it perhaps precludes and ex-
acerbates, and how informal norms and discourses complement legal regu-
lation in ordering creative processes. 
In addition to prevailing quantitative approaches and emerging experi-
mental settings, this empirical turn in copyright research has also been driv-
en by qualitative studies that shed light on the practices, routines and norms 
of creatives and how these relate to legal provisions such as copyright and 
patents.3 Especially the literature on low IP regimes provides instructive 
insights into the different modalities of organizing and regulating the pro-
duction and circulation of creative goods. In many case studies, scholars 
have learned that the absence of formal IP protection does not mean the 
absence of IP control: Communities such as French chefs, comedians and 
magicians have developed their own set of rules delineating legitimate and 
illegitimate practices.4 
In sum, there is ample empirical evidence supporting the position 
that when seeking to understand the circulation of creative goods there is 
                                                                                                                       
2. See Mark M. A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 
1328 (2015), and Dan Burk, On the sociology of patenting, 101 Minn. L. Rev., 421-452 
(2016) for a recent discussion of this discrepancy. See also Ruth Towse, Creativity, copy-
right and the creative industries paradigm, 63 KYKLOS, 461 (2010); Christian Handke, 
Economic effects of copyright (2011); Jeanette Hofmann, Christian Katzenbach & Merlin 
Münch, Kulturgütermärkte im Schatten des Urheberrechts, 62 AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGES-
CHICHTE, 39-45 (2012); R. Towse, The quest for evidence on the economic effects of copy-
right law, 37 Cambridge Journal of Economics 1187 (2013). 
3. Silbey, supra note 1, and Murray, Piper & Kirstenson, supra note 1.  
4. See for paradigmatic case studies Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, 
Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs. 19(2) ORGAN. SCI., 
187-201 (2008) (on French chefs); Dotan Oliar & Christopher C. J. Sprigman, There's No 
Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transfor-
mation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 Virginia Law Review 1787 (2008), Jacob Loshin, Secrets 
Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC 
123, (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2008); and for a recent collection CREATIVITY WITHOUT 
LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Kate Darling & 
Aaron Perzanowski, 2017). 
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always more than law involved: These are informal norms, discourses, eco-
nomic rationales and the technologies underlying creative practices. These 
frames may align with copyright provisions, but in many cases they do not.5 
What is still lacking, though, is a theoretical approach to understand and 
investigate these phenomena within a systematic and comparative frame-
work. 
This paper contributes to empirical copyright research by presenting 
an integrated governance perspective. This conceptual framework seeks to 
enable the identification and comparison of different modes of ordering and 
control in creative production and distribution. Based on sociological insti-
tutionalism, this governance perspective does not privilege law ex-ante, but 
positions norms, discourses, and technology as (analytically) equally rele-
vant dimensions of copyright governance.  
The reasoning of the paper is presented in three parts: Firstly, I draw 
on Murray, Piper, and Robertson6 to argue against a low IP exceptionalism. 
The norms and routines ordering creative production in sectors of low IP 
protection are not unique to these sectors. Instead, they are constitutive of 
all processes of creative production. Norms and routines are not mere re-
placements for legal measures in a “negative space of IP”.7 Instead, it is 
argued here, they are always already present in every form of cultural pro-
duction and circulation. Thus, the ordering of creative production and circu-
lation is a multimodal process that is realized in many dimensions. This 
perspective is, secondly, developed into a conceptual framework based on 
sociological institutionalism (SI) with four modalities of copyright govern-
ance: (1) A regulative dimension, addressing the provision and enforcement 
of formal rules, such as laws, court decisions, terms of services; (2) a nor-
mative dimension, investigating the prevalent assumptions about legitimate 
and illegitimate behavior in a specific community or sector; (3) a discursive 
dimension, addressing the framings and debates on creativity, authorship, 
and originality; and (4) a technological dimension that investigates the em-
bodiment of affordances and rules in infrastructures, devices and algorithms 
relevant to creative work. This will allow us to empirically study the impact 
and mutual relations of the different modalities across creative sectors. To 
illustrate this concept, thirdly, the paper discusses the implications of this 
model for existing case studies on low IP regimes and other sectors. 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
5. See Silbey, supra note 1, 81-148. 
6. Murray, Piper & Kirstenson, supra note 1.  
7. Elizabeth Rosenblatt, A theory of IP's negative space, 34(3) COLUM. J.L. & ARTS, 
317-365 (2011) 
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II. BEYOND LOW IP REGIMES: THERE'S ALWAYS MORE THAN LAW 
 
A.  Low IP Regimes: IP without Law? 
 
This investigation into heterogeneous modes of ordering creative 
production and circulation takes as its starting point the literature on low IP 
regimes. In empirical studies, scholars are exploring creative practices and 
products that are hardly amenable to formal IP regulation. Studies on magi-
cians8, French chefs9, comedians10 and roller derby players11 have demon-
strated that there is more than law in controlling and circulating creative 
work. In the absence of clear-cut legal protection, these communities have 
developed norms and routines that delineate acceptable from objectionable 
practices, thus bringing about “Intellectual Property without law”.12 The 
focus on informal regulation in research addressing these seemingly discon-
nected fields stems from their legal peculiarity: Comedy, magic, and cook-
ing are hardly regulated by formal legal measures. Given this context, 
stakeholders need to mobilize different modes of regulation other than law 
in order to coordinate their creative practices and products. In these studies, 
it is community norms that regulate creative practices and sanction deviant 
behavior by measures such as exclusion. 
By looking at the fashion industry, Raustiala and Sprigman13 have 
given this perspective a slightly different spin: While this sector is highly 
monetized and subject to a considerate number of formal regulations 
(trademark, design patents), they are able to show that the sector lacks con-
sistent legal rules for its key creative work: fashion design.14 Intellectual 
property rights are not able to effectively delineate between legitimate in-
spiration on the one hand and illegitimate plagiarism on the other hand. 
However, against all assumptions of conventional IP theory, “piracy” does 
                                                                                                                       
8. Loshin, supra note 4. 
9. Fauchart & van Hippel, supra note 4. 
10. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 4. 
11. David Fagundes, Talk derby to me: Intellectual property norms governing roller 
derby pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2011). 
12. Loshin, supra note 4.  
13. Kai Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Privacy Paradox: Innovation and In-
tellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). 
14. See Rustiala &Sprigman, supra note 14, 1699-1705; see also Jessica Litman, The 
Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 29, 44-45 (1994); Susan Scafidi, 
Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH (YU, ED.) (2006); Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne J. C. Fromer, Fashion's 
Function in Intellectual Property Law, 93 Notre Dame Law Review Forthcoming  (2017). 
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not lead to market failure here, according to Raustiala and Sprigman, but to 
a flourishing, innovative industry.15 
Scholars have addressed a similar puzzle regarding the trade in TV 
formats.16 The legal protection of formats is arguably very weak, yet there 
is a highly profitable global licensing market for formats. Why do organiza-
tions pay to license a format that is not consistently protected? Why develop 
new formats if you can free ride on existing ones? Standard IP theory 
“would predict that in the absence of intellectual property protection, the 
TV show format industry has insufficient incentives to invest in creative 
innovation”.17 But producers do invest in new formats. There is not much 
research on this topic, but empirical studies and economic theory suggest 
that a mix of business strategies, professional practices and community 
norms drive the necessary level of innovation in this sector.18 Similarly to 
the fashion industry, imitation as a form of “herding behaviour”19 generates 
rather than innovation hindering it. In a multi-method study on imitation 
and innovation in game production, we identified similar strategies and pro-
fessional norms.20 Kate Darling has investigated the strategies of the online 
adult entertainment industry to cope with a low level of copyright enforce-
ment.21 Based on qualitative interviews, she has learned that producers shift 
towards the production of experience goods rather than replicable works.22  
Consumer privacy preferences, consumption habits, low production costs, 
and a continuing high demand also help this business to thrive sustainably.23  
In sum, the literature on low IP regimes supports the position that 
strong community norms can make up for the lack of formal IP regulation. 
This perspective has been extended to more commercial, and arguably less 
community-driven sectors, such as fashion, TV formats, game production, 
and online adult entertainment. While not constituting clear-cut low IP re-
gimes, creative production in these sectors is not easily protected by formal 
                                                                                                                       
15. Raustiala &Sprigman, supra note 13, 1717-1761. 
16. Stefan Bechtold, The fashion of TV show formats, MICH. ST. L. REV., 451- 462 
(2013); Martin Kretschmer & Sukhpreet Singh, Exploiting Idols: A case study of interna-
tional TV formats trading in the absence of intellectual property protection (2010). 
17. Bechtold, supra note 16, at 451. 
18. Id.; Kretschmer & Singh, supra note 16. 
19. Bechtold, supra note 16. 
20. Christian Katzenbach, Sarah Herweg & Lies van Roessel, Copies, Clones and 
Genre Building, INT. J. COMM. 10, 838-859 (2016); Lies van Roessel & Christian Katzen-
bach, NAVIGATING THE GREY AREA: GAME PRODUCTION BETWEEN INSPIRATION AND IMITA-
TION [Manuscript currently under review], (2017). 
21. Kate Darling, IP without IP? A study of the online adult entertainment industry, 
STAN. L. REV. 17, 709-771 (2013). 
22. Darling, supra note 21, at 765-769. 
23. Darling, supra note 21, at 738-758. 
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IP regulation – either because it lacks suitable measures to protect the key 
creative output (fashion, TV formats, games) or effective enforcement 
(online adult entertainment). Professionals and companies in these sectors 
complement this not by strong community norms, but rather by a mix of 
business strategies, professional norms, and work routines. 
 
B.  Against the Exceptionalism of Low IP Regimes: There's Always More 
than Law 
 
This strand of research routinely presents low IP regimes as the ex-
ceptional case, the “negative space of IP”24 that represents a puzzle in light 
of standard theory. Similarly, the strategies in the more complex examples 
of fashion, TV formats, games, and online adult entertainment are regarded 
as counter-measures to compensate for a lack of copyright protection and 
enforcement. Taken together, the literature tends to consider these sectors as 
instructive, yet exceptional cases. In contrast, most creative sectors are well 
covered by copyright and other IP regulation, so they do not need informal 
norms or other complementary strategies, one might argue.  
But this position overlooks some constitutive aspects of ordering 
creative production and circulation: that there is always more than law. Low 
IP regimes are only exceptional cases with regard to their legal situation. 
Beyond a “legal centralism”,25 a broad set of empirical studies and different 
humanities theories show us that informal norms, discourses, economic ra-
tionales, and technologies of production and circulation always contribute 
to framing and ordering creative practices – whether law provides adequate 
control or not. As Laura Murray, Tina Piper, and Kirsty Robertson rightly 
assert, “all creative practices – not merely niches such as magic and stand-
up comedy – feature some sort of embodied ideas about attribution, custo-
dianship, and fair practice.”26  
Studies on game design27 and a wide range of other creative practic-
es28 indicate that creators always hold strong concepts of their creative prac-
tice and opinions about their relation to their work, sometimes aligning with 
IP provisions and sometimes not.29 In fact, many professionals do not know 
the applicable copyright regulations, and many rarely encounter or explicit-
                                                                                                                       
24. Rosenblatt, supra note 7. 
25. Fagundes, supra note 11, at 1098. 
26. Murray, Piper & Robertson, supra note 1, at 6. 
27. See Tom Phillips, “Don’t clone my indie game, bro”: Informal cultures of video-
game regulation in the independent sector, 24 CULTURAL TRENDS 143 (2015); Van Roessel 
& Katzenbach, supra note 20, at 10.  
28. See Silbey, supra note 5, and Murray, Piper & Robertson, supra note 1. 
29. Silbey, supra note 1, at 81-148. 
8  [Vol. XX 
ly reflect on legal issues in their working routines.30 Fagundes’ study on 
names and branding in roller derby that informal norms emerge regardless 
of existing formal IP measures.31 In her extensive study on creative practic-
es in sectors with mostly strong IP coverage, Jessica Silbey finds strong 
opinions and informal norms among the interviewees regarding the creative 
process and the circulation of the creative output.32 For different aspects and 
sectors, Silbey identifies mismatches between the creatives’ own positions 
and formal IP regulation. Especially regarding the creative process itself, 
the interviews indicate that copyright and patent law is of very little practi-
cal importance. Additionally, experimental studies indicate that creative 
practices are motivated by a wide array of factors, law being one among 
many.33 
So there is ample empirical evidence for the position that there is 
always already more than law in ordering creative practices and the circula-
tion of creative works. Informal norms and routines do not only comple-
ment law in the absence of formal regulation – but they are always in-
volved. But how do these different mechanisms and dimensions interact? 
How do they mutually reinforce or undermine each other? How can they be 
included in a systematic and comparative framework for investigating the 
ordering of creative practices and the circulation of creative works – with-
out privileging law ex-ante? This paper sets out to contribute to the theoret-
ical advancement of empirical copyright research. In the following, I sug-
gest building blocks for a holistic understanding of the governance of crea-
tive practices and the circulation of creative works. 
 
III. A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE FOR EMPIRICAL COPYRIGHT RE-
SEARCH 
 
The development of a comprehensive framework for analyzing the 
ordering of creative practices and the circulation of creative outputs can 
take different approaches with different theoretical underpinnings. One 
prevalent and instructive approach is transaction cost economics and its 
variations in economic and institutional theory. Another one addresses mo-
tives and incentives on the individual level of creatives and users of creative 
                                                                                                                       
30. See Van Roessel & Christian Katzenbach, supra note 20, at 18. 
31. Fagundes, supra note 11. 
32. Silbey, supra note 1, at 25-54. 
33. Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: 
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010); Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimen-
tal tests of intellectual property laws’ creativity thresholds, 93 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1921 
(2014). 
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products. Psychologically informed research has provided insight into the 
reasoning of individuals creating, using and sharing potentially copyrighted 
works.  
This paper, in turn, is grounded in sociological institutionalism. The 
focus in this perspective is neither on individual motives nor on the calcula-
tion of transaction costs, but on the processes of developing and contesting 
shared norms. Put simply, sociological institutionalism is interested in the 
ways communities or societies negotiate and establish shared expectations 
about legitimate and illegitimate practices. For copyright research, and spe-
cifically for empirical copyright research this promises to provide a useful 
theoretical avenue. Building on these concepts will allow scholars to inte-
grate the different mechanisms of ordering at play in creative sectors in a 
systematic and comparative framework. In contrast to psychological and 
transaction cost frameworks, this perspective focuses on the meso- and 
macro-levels of negotiating and contesting norms and understanding. It is 
thus well positioned to integrate formal regulation on the same level. 
Institutions, in this line of theory, are not understood as or restricted 
to formal organizations or rules. Instead they are, in a broader sense, “build-
ing-blocks of social order”.34 They manifest themselves in different forms 
such as informal norms, daily routines, organizational procedures, common 
sayings, but also formal regulations. In essence, institutions “represent so-
cially sanctioned, that is, collectively enforced expectations with respect to 
the behavior of specific categories of actors or the performance of certain 
activities. Typically they involve mutually related rights and obligations for 
actors, distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate, “right” and 
“wrong”, “possible” and “impossible”35 actions and thereby organizing be-
havior into predictable and reliable patterns. 
This understanding of institutions focuses on the mutual expecta-
tions of social actors and suggests different ways and processes that inform 
these expectations. The classification of practices as right/wrong, appropri-
ate/inappropriate already anticipates the potential of this sort of institutional 
theory for the endeavor at hand here: Considering norms, discourses and 
technology as potentially functional equivalents to copyright regulation, this 
perspective is agnostic to the different possible modalities of substantiating 
an institution, i.e. of delineating right/wrong, appropriate/inappropriate – 
law is but one factor.  
An important element in this line of institutional theory is its sensi-
tivity to less obvious factors of institutionalization. Prominently, sociolo-
                                                                                                                       
34. WOLFGANG STREECK & KATHLEEN ANN THELEN, BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES, 9 (2005). 
35. Id. 
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gists have stressed the cognitive and discursive dimension of institutions. 
These dimensions influence behavior not only by normative guidance and 
by specifying what one should do, but more fundamentally – and maybe 
even more effectively – by specifying what we imagine that we could do in 
a given context.36 In this perspective, institutions do not primarily consist of 
“norms and values but [of] taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifica-
tions“.37  
In a recent paper, Dan Burk has analyzed the development and ap-
plication of patent law from a similar perspective.38 Based on sociological 
institutionalism, he insightfully uncovers the myths and mythology of pa-
tent law. His analysis is based on the cognitive dimensions of institutions 
and thus highlights the prevalent social understandings that bind communi-
ties together. Burk argues convincingly that, as narratives that are “true but 
not factual”39, myths contribute to explaining the “puzzle” of the patent law 
system40 that has often been proved ineffective, but remains remarkably 
stable.  
Starting from the same basis, this paper takes a different route in ex-
plaining and investigating matters of intellectual property in context. Burk 
exclusively focuses on the cognitive dimension of institutions. In contrast, 
this paper follows his call to integrate the other “pillars of institutions”.41 If 
succesful, this should facilitate a comparative approach focused on the in-
tersection of and interplay between the different dimensions. In turn, the 
object of explanation here is more restricted than in Burk’s paper. Whereas 
he delivers a meta-analysis of the consolidation of the patent law system, 
the framework developed here aims to investigate the classification of actu-
al practices as legitimate/illegitimate with regard to creative works – in oth-
er words: this paper addressess the governance of creative practices and 
products. But both are interested in understanding the role of law in social 
practices,42 thus contributing to a instructive shift in perspective, as Jessica 
Silbey as pointed out: Instead of imposing ex-ante “the view that intellectu-
al property ‘incentivizes’ innovation and creativity, and then showing how 
IP is not working as it should, a social science investigation asks the empir-
                                                                                                                       
36. Lynn G. Zucker, Organizations as Institutions, 2(1) RES. SOC. ORGAN. (1983). 
37. PAUL J. DIMAGGIO & WALTER W. POWELL, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN OR-
GANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, 15 (1991). 
38. Dan Burk, supra note 2. 
39. Id., 429. 
40. Id., 423. 
41. Dan Burk, supra note 2, at 451. 
42. Jessica Silbey, Heuristic Interventions in the Study of Intellectual Property, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 333, 334 (2016). 
2017] There's Always More than Law! 11 
ical question that Burk urges we begin to ask with more determination: 
‘[J]ust what roles [are] patents . . . playing?’43 
The model for the empirical study of social practices and the role of 
copyright presented here rests on Richard Scott’s typology of institutions, 
which contain a regulative, a normative and cultural-cognitive pillar.44 In 
his synthesis of institutional theories, he summarizes that institutions are 
“set in motion by regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements.”45 
From this perspective, shared expectations, mutually related rights and obli-
gations, as well as common assumptions about right and wrong, possible 
and impossible practices are not only constituted by law but also by norma-
tive orientations and cognitive framings. As these elements interact, com-
plement and sometimes conflict with each other rather than constituting 
separate entities, I prefer to call them dimensions instead of pillars. The 
enduring and coercive impact of institutions then strongly relies on the co-
herence of these dimensions, as Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack ex-
plain: “the stability, robustness and self-reproducing characters of institu-
tions will be all the more pronounced that regulative pressures and systems 
of control combine with normative and cognitive frames and reinforce each 
other.”46 Conflicts typically arise when informal norms and formal law—or 
any other dimension—diverge with regard to evaluating right/wrong, ap-
propriate/inappropriate practices. 
Turning to copyright, this concept of institutions allows us to devel-
op a multimodal framework to analyze the governance of creative practices 
and products: It posits that there is (1.) a regulative dimension, addressing 
the provision and enforcement of formal rules, such as laws, court deci-
sions, contracts, and corporate policies. In short: copyright as usual. But this 
is only one of many dimensions and not necessarily a privileged one. There 
is (2.) the normative dimension, describing the prevalent assumptions about 
legitimate and illegitimate behavior in a specific community or sector (ie. 
the community norms in the low IP literature). In addition, institutional the-
ory suggests (3.) a cognitive and discursive dimension, addressing the 
shared (or contested) understandings and framings of issues in certain con-
texts- An example of the context of copyright relates to the understandings 
and debates on what constitutes creativity in the first place, the role of orig-
                                                                                                                       
43. Id., 347.  
44. RICHARD W. SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS AND INTERESTS, 
51 (2008). 
45. Ib., 49. 
46. Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack, Theoretical Building Blocks for a Research 
Agenda Linking Globalization and Institutions, in GLOBALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONS: 
REDEFINING THE RULES OF THE ECONOMIC GAME 15, 20 (Sigrid Quack ed., 2003). 
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inality, or the identification of authorship. While not explicitly present in 
Scott’s model of institutions, it seems reasonable to add (4.) a material or 
technological dimension that takes into account the affordances and rules 
embodied in infrastructures, devices, and algorithms relevant to creative 
work. Scott already concedes that artifacts are important “carriers” for sus-
taining institutions.47 But research in Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) has shown that technologies and artifacts are more active elements in 
building and constituting social order.48 They do more than just to “embody 
and represent particular constellations of ideas”.49 Road bumps, bridges,50 
automatic door closers, or heavy tags on hotel keys51 are the classic exam-
ples in this “sociology of things” that illustrate how artifacts have a strong 
impact on the way we move, talk, and interact. In this sense, technology is 
an institutionalized form of social interactions or structures that, once insti-
tutionalized, has an effect on the social. 
 
 
Figure 1: Layers of Institutions 
 
This model diverges from prevalent thinking about copyright regula-
tion in two ways: Firstly, it integrates different modes of ordering into a 
coherent framework for a empircal research. Thus, it reflects the findings 
and arguments stemming from the low IP literature that informal norms and 
shared beliefs are always involved in creative practices – not only in niche 
sectors. The relation between these dimensions are not set ex-ante by stating 
                                                                                                                       
47. Id., 83-85. 
48. Bruno Latour, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL (2008). 
49. Scott, supra note 44, at 85. 
50. Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS, 121 (1980). 
51. Bruno Latour, Technology is Society made durable, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MON-
STERS 103 (JOHN LAW ED., 1991). 
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a putative absence of formal regulation, and norms acting as a surrogate. 
Instead, they operate on equal footing. The relation between laws, norms, 
and discourses then is an empirical question that is amenable to research.52 
Does copyright law prohibit creative practices that are deemed legitimate 
within a specific context or across an entire society? Are the understandings 
and routines of creative production in all creative sectors compatible with 
the categories of copyright (authorship, work, etc.)? Which creative practic-
es do current or past technologies enable and promote and which ones are 
constrained, not or no longer possible? Does this realm of possibilities align 
well with informal norms and copyright provisions? In this sense, the legit-
imacy and robustness of institutions are dependent on the coherence of the-
se dimensions. In sum, this model provides an integrative framework for 
empirical copyright research that allows us to investigate and compare for-
mal regulations, norms, discourses, and material-technological elements as 
distinct, yet interdependent modes of copyright governance.  
The second feature of this model is that it rests on the notion of gov-
ernance rather than regulation. While governance as a concept is “notori-
ously slippery”,53 it provides analytical value in broadening the concept of 
regulation. At its core, governance refers to all patterns of rule, and explor-
ing governance means exploring the construction of social order and social 
coordination.54 Patterns of rule and ordering mechanisms can take different 
forms and different trajectories, and thus the notion of governance resonates 
well with the institutional framework presented here. In contrast, the notion 
of regulation is characterized by intentional and goal-directed interventions 
into a policy domain. Julia Black defines regulation as “a process involving 
the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of others according 
to identified purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified 
outcome.”55 Regulation may take the form of legislation, private self-
regulation or multi-actor arrangements; in all cases, however, it links order-
ing processes with explicit objectives and measures. Regulatory actors, pri-
vate or public, assess their options to intervene in a specific field and use 
the means they deem effective to achieve a desired outcome.56 Copyright is 
                                                                                                                       
52. And with that, it resonates with Burks call for agnostically trying to understand 
what IP really does in practice, not assuming an incentive function (or any other) ex-ante, 
supra note 2, at 452. Similary Silbey, supra note 42, at 347. 
53. Jon Pierre & Guy B. Peters, GOVERNANCE, POLITICS AND THE STATE, 7 (2008). 
54. Mark Bevir, KEY CONCEPTS IN GOVERNANCE, 3 (2009). 
55. Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the role of regulation and 
self-regulation in a ‘post-regulatory’ world, 54(1) CURR. LEG. PROBL., 103-146 (2001). 
56. Jeanette Hofmann, Christian Katzenbach & Kirsten Gollatz, Between Coordina-
tion and Regulation: Finding the Governance in Internet Governance, NEW MEDIA & SOC., 
1-18, at 13 (2016). 
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routinely discussed from a regulatory perspective. Which effects do specific 
provisions have on creative practices or consumption behavior? How can 
copyright be changed in order to reach desired outcomes? In contrast, the 
governance perspective put forward here focuses on how certain frames and 
norms constitute, inform, and question the practices of creatives, as well as 
users of creative products. This complements the prevalent regulatory per-
spective in important ways, not only because controlling IP involves more 
than law—but also because the reference points of our actions are not solely 
there to guide our creative practices. Shared beliefs, motives, and legitimi-
zations are not here to regulate our practices; they have emerged in long-
term processes – and only sometimes they, implicitly or explicitly, inform 
and guide what we do. In sum, this copyright governance model attributes 
the ordering and regulation of creative practices to the mutual reinforcement 
(or weakening) between regulative, normative, discursive, and material el-
ements – some of which are designed to regulate, but many of which are 
not. 
 
IV. MODES OF COPYRIGHT GOVERNANCE: REGULATION, NORMS, 
DISCOURSE, TECHNOLOGY 
  
This section illustrates the analytical and empirical value of the pro-
posed model by spelling out the kind of questions and answers it enables, 
and by providing a short application of the model to the governance of imi-
tation and innovation in game development. This illustrative case study is 
based on a multi-method case investigation: A document analysis of indus-
try handbooks, a discourse analysis of contested cases, and extensive inter-
views with different professionals and stakeholders from the games sector 
in Germany. We conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty German 
game practitioners and four legal consultants and in-house lawyers, taking 
about 90 minutes each.  
 
 Research Questions Empirical Account Examples 
Regulative 
Dimension 
Which actors establish 
which rules (scope!)? 
How is compliance 
monitored and deviation 
sanctioned? 
How are Rules inter-
preted and adapted? 
Legal Analysis,  
Policy Docu-
ments, 
Legislation Pro-
cess 
 
Copyright for 
Games, 
ND Agreements, 
Internal Corporate 
Policies, 
Terms of Service 
of Development 
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Environments 
Normative 
Dimension 
With which normative 
expectations are actors 
confronted? 
Which expectations are 
internalized?  
How are these norms 
establish and negotiat-
ed? 
Interviews, 
Ethnographies, 
Participatory 
Observations 
 
Norms within 
Communities,  
Comedy, 
French Chefs 
 
Discursive 
Dimension 
What is „taken for 
granted“?  
Construction and de-
construction of shared 
frames and perspectives 
Discourse Anal-
yses, 
Politicization, 
Issue Formation, 
Frames 
 
Debates around 
„Piracy“ and 
„Stealing“ IP, 
Understandings of 
Authorship and 
Creativity 
Technolog-
ical Dimen-
sion 
Which rules and as-
sumptions are inscribed 
into technology?  
How do services and 
algorithms structure and 
regulate our creative 
practices and our media 
usage? 
Analyses of 
Technologies, 
Ethnographies of 
Tinkering, 
Digital Methods, 
User Interactions 
 
Digital Rights 
Management, 
YouTube‘s Up-
load-Filtering 
(Content ID), 
Development Envi-
ronment 
 
Table 1: Modes and Lead Questions of Copyright Governance 
 
A.  Regulative Dimension  
 
The regulative dimension is the one that is most familiar to scholars 
of copyright. In addressing the manifest rules and regulations, it is mainly 
concerned with laws, contracts, court decisions and other legal documents. 
As an institutional element, the regulative dimension operates essentially in 
three steps: rule-setting, monitoring, and enforcement. In this view, institu-
tions are accomplished through “the capacity to establish rules, inspect oth-
ers' conformity to them, and, as necessary, manipulate sanctions – rewards 
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or punishments – in an attempt to influence future behavior.”57 Researching 
this aspect of governance might be considered business-as-usual for copy-
right scholarship, hence this paper will not go into much detail here. Inves-
tigating this dimension can include both the substance of rules (e.g. legal 
analysis) as well as its emergence and implementation (e.g. policy analysis).  
In the case study, we were interested in understanding how different 
modes of governance frame and regulate imitation and innovation in game 
production. The production of games is characterized by the fact that imita-
tion is a common and necessary industry practice that even spurs innova-
tion. Entire game genres (one think of platform side scroller games or first 
person shooters) have emerged by re-making and extending on great 
games.58 While the view that imitation is a constituent part of innovation 
seems to be shared throughout the industry. Recent tussles over alleged 
clones have sparked lively discussions about legitimate and illegitimate 
imitation practices in game development. 
Interestingly, the legal and regulative dimension is far from provid-
ing a clear-cut answer for “navigating this grey zone”.59 Games are com-
posed of several elements (rules, graphics, source code, audio), some of 
which can be separately protected by intellectual property law. For instance, 
the source code and audiovisual elements are protected by copyright, and 
game hardware manufacturers often have their technology patented.60 How-
ever, a unique part of games compared to other audiovisual media is the 
rule-based system. For example, in the case of chess, it is not the exact col-
ors and shapes of the pieces that define the game, it is the possible moves 
and affordances of the pieces, the actions that emerge from these affordanc-
es and the interplay between the actions. Such rule-based systems could 
arguably be understood as (abstract) ideas rather than (concrete, fixed) ex-
pressions.61 As such, games have an “uncopyrightable core: the actual play 
of the game”.62 Thus, the long-lasting tension between imitation and inspi-
                                                                                                                       
57. Scott, supra note 44, at 52. 
58. JESPER JUUL, A CASUAL REVOLUTION: REINVENTING VIDEO GAMES AND THEIR 
PLAYERS. (2010).  
59. Van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 20. 
60. CASEY O'DONNELL, DEVELOPER'S DILEMMA: THE SECRET WORLD OF VIDEOGAME 
CREATORS (2014); Arya Tayebi, Interactivity, Immersion and Innovation: Can videogames 
be adequately protected by copyright law? available at: https://aryatayebi.wordpress.com/ 
2012/02/10/interactivity-immersion-and-ideas-can-videogames-be-adequately-protected-
by-copyright-law/ (2012). 
61. Greg Lastowka, Copyright Law and Video Games: A Brief History of an Interac-
tive Medium (2013); Tayebi, supra note 43. 
62. Bruce E. Boyden, Games and other uncopyrightable systems, Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
18(2), 439-479, at 479 (2011). 
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ration in the games sector and the conflicts around the alleged copying of 
games is not easily resolved in the regulative dimension.63 
In the interviews we conducted, we were confronted with a striking 
neglect of the regulative dimension both with regard to the tension between 
imitation and innovation as well as to legal aspects of game production in 
general. To put it plainly, the designers, graphic artists and programmers 
that produce the games we play every day, and that generate enormous rev-
enues, do neither reflect legal issues in their daily work routines nor are 
there regular interactions with legal staff. They seem to operate with vague 
lay concepts of copyright in the back of their minds; when asked directly 
most developers could not assess correctly if a certain game element was 
protected by copyright or not, or if a certain practice crosses the line to in-
fringement. Only in big studios professional legal assessments are included 
in the process, but at very late stages when production is mostly done and 
marketing kicks in. In sum, the regulative dimension is not totally absent 
from creative processes of game production, but it is certainly in the back-
ground. 
 
B.  Normative Dimension 
 
The normative dimension addresses values and norms that classify 
practices as legitimate/illegitimate and appropriate/inappropriate. In contrast 
to the regulative dimension, rules here are neither manifest nor are they 
sanctioned by defined punishments. Instead, they are grounded in shared 
values and operate as normative expectations: “The expectations are held by 
other salient actors in the situation, and so are experienced by the focal ac-
tor as external pressures. And, to varying degrees, they become internalized 
by the actor.“64 Typically, norms are strongly contextual and differ between 
communities, societies and world regions. This dimension of governance 
operates according to a “logic of appropriateness”.65 In this perspective, 
people do not behave according to an economic calculus nor to a legal as-
sessment, but they adjust their actions to what they perceive as appropriate 
in a certain situation and context.  
 
                                                                                                                       
63. The assessment of games as objects of copyright and related IP provisions is not 
key to the argument of this paper, so I keep it short. Cf. Lastowka, supra note 61;, Tayebi 
supra note 60, and Boyden, supra note 62, for thorough analyses of copyright’s application 
to digital games and long lists of court cases. 
64. Scott, supra note 44, at 55. 
65. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE OR-
GANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS, 23 (1989). 
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To act appropriately is to proceed according to the 
institutionalized practices of a collectivity and mutu-
al understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, 
right, and good. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations 
and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a 
membership in a political community. Rules are fol-
lowed because they are perceived to be adequate for 
the task at hand and to have normative validity.66 
  
The literature on low IP regimes is strongly based on this perspec-
tive, although sometimes the connection is not always drawn. The commu-
nity of French chef investigated by Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von 
Hippel displays typical aspects of normative ordering.67 Implicit rules and 
shared expectations about legitimate and illegitimate practices are estab-
lished, such as a prohibition of 1:1 copies, confidentiality, and referencing 
the original creator.68 Non-compliance to these expectations is not sanc-
tioned by monetary or legal punishments but by exclusion from the com-
munity and from further sharing of expertise.69 With recipes and original 
ideas for the combination of ingredients not being protected by formal IP 
provisions but by these informal norms, the normative dimension and the 
regulative dimension are not congruent in the case of French haute cuisine.   
Our interview study on game production, similarly revealed diver-
gence between these dimensions but with a weaker normative stance and 
less cohesion within the community. There is consensus between profes-
sionals across the industry that “re-skinning” a game, that is plainly copying 
a game and only changing the art style, is an objectionable practice. Espe-
cially if the rule-based system strongly shapes the gameplay experience, 
copying the system and merely coating it with another visual layer is even 
more illegitimate. “I think it’s okay if you just copy the idea […] and do 
your own game, your own balancing, your own pricing. What is harder or, 
what I think you should not do, or what I don't wanna do myself, is to take a 
game and copy it exactly, only change the art stuff.” This informal norm 
runs counter the regulative dimension, since copying the game idea and 
game play does not constitute copyright infringement as long as you re-
program and re-skin the product.  
                                                                                                                       
66. Johan P. Olsen, Understanding Institutions and Logics of Appropriateness, 3 
(2007). 
67. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4. 
68. Id., 193. 
69. Id., 195. 
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On the other hand, the copyright infringing practice of taking art as-
sets of classic games such as Super Mario is in many cases considered legit-
imate practice, as long as the game developers add interesting twists to their 
own game and not merely copy the whole game.  
In sum, the normative dimension rests on cohesive communities and 
societies to establish shared norms and expectations. The evocative cases of 
the low IP literature are examples of that (French chefs, US comedians, ma-
gicians). In the case of the games industry, we found community norms to 
be less strong. This might be no surprise since the market is huge, global 
and highly profitable which rather hinders the development of shared 
norms. Only in the sub-set of so-called Indie Developers strong community 
norms and beliefs were recognizable.  
 
C.  Discursive Dimension 
 
The third dimension addressed the ways we understand and talk 
about creative practices and products. This does not necessarily imply direct 
normative assessment but nonetheless shapes our thinking and doing. In 
Scott’s institutional theory, this dimension is denoted as the “cultural-
cognitive pillar” of institutions. In that view, “compliance occurs in many 
circumstances because other types of behavior are inconceivable; routines 
are followed because they are taken for granted as “the way we do these 
things”.70 In contrast to the regulative and the normative dimension, prac-
tices here at not explicitly classified as legitimate//illegitimate. We just take 
certain things as taken-for-granted and routinely follow these assumptions.  
Dan Burk’s paper on the sociology of patenting addresses this di-
mension.71 When he refers to Mircea Eliade’s definition of myths as narra-
tives that are “true but not factual”,72 he exactly refers to the enduring quali-
ty and impact of widely shared beliefs that are deeply embedded in social 
routines and structures, so that questioning them is a hard job, even with 
good reasons.  
In this paper, I rename this dimension as discursive dimension, be-
cause communication and discourses are the medium in which these beliefs 
and frames can be identified. With “piracy” and “stealing” on the one hand, 
and “sharing” on the other hand, the copyright debates are replete with ex-
amples for discursive struggles over the ways we should understand and 
frame the changing practices of media and culture. Whereas most scholar-
ship addresses these debates only as prelude or as independent variable for 
                                                                                                                       
70. Scott, supra note 44, at 58. 
71. Burk, supra note 2. 
72. Id., 429; MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY (1963). 
20  [Vol. XX 
the real thing: copyright reform and legislation,73 an institutional under-
standing of governance suggests to take the discursive dimension serious in 
its own right: Words matter!  
The brilliant works by Martha Woodmansee74 and Mark Rose75 on 
the emergence of the author-concept and its important impact on the consol-
idation of copyright as a legal instrument point to another aspect of this di-
mension. The regulative as well as the normative dimension are strongly 
dependent on the discursive dimension. Here, subjects and categories are 
constructed, and only on these grounds normative and regulatory provisions 
can operate. How do we come to privilege the author over the paper factory 
with regard to a book? Why do we take the idea of a self-contained work for 
granted, although we know that we all stand on the shoulders of giants?76 
With regard to our interview study, I highlight three strong currents 
in this dimension. The first concerns creators’ understanding of game de-
sign. All game professionals interviewed hold that game production is a 
highly collaborative process, full of mutual imitation and references. Devis-
ing new games, always and necessarily, includes great portions of existing 
ideas. Indeed, for a new game to become a good game, professionals argue 
that you should not innovate on all levels of game design; otherwise players 
would be confused and unable to play the game. Instead, remixing existing 
elements and giving the game an original twist is considered good game 
design: “A lot of time it's more about picking the right ingredients that are 
already there. I mean, 95% of what we do always [already] exists some-
where.” The second aspect concerns game professionals’ self-concept as 
creatives. Almost all interviewees, whether working as independent game 
developers or as employees in a big studio, considered themselves as crea-
tive professionals, thus aiming for producing something new and original in 
their daily job. This self-concept has ramifications for the tension between 
imitation and innovation discussed here. Even if the management demands 
replicas of successful games by competitors, the developers are guided by 
strong intrinsic motivations to include original elements in the new game. 
                                                                                                                       
73. Cf. the excellent work by SEBASTIAN HAUNSS, CONFLICTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE 
SOCIETY: THE CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2013) and many oth-
ers. 
74. Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Condi-
tions of the Emergence of the 'Author'. 17(4) EIGHTEENTH-CENT. STUD., 425-448 (1984). 
75. Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of 
Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS, 51-85 (1988). 
76. Regulatory theory has somehow included this into its concepts by acknowledging 
that  „the underlying ideas [...] and the broader intellectual climate that regulatory instru-
ments“ (ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULA-
TION, 52 [2012]) – but again only as a prelude to “serious” regulation.  
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As one interviewee put it: “I always try to smuggle something in.” A third 
element in this dimension stemming from the interviews is a strong under-
standing of authorship in a sub-set of the interviewees. Especially, indie 
developers articulate a strong identification with their work. They consider 
the developed games as “theirs”, as personal expressions. They understand 
the games they produce not foremost as commercial products but as “heart 
projects.” Some indie developers interviewed classified their games as “Au-
torenspiele” [author games]. 
 
D.  Technological Dimension 
 
The fourth dimension in this copyright governance model is the ma-
terial-technological layer. The services and devices we use in our private 
and professional lives enable and at the same time constrain the range of 
actions we pursue. From an institutional perspective, they contribute to or-
dering the social jointly with regulative, normative and discursive elements. 
As John Law writes:  “Machines, architectures, clothes, texts – all contrib-
ute to the patterning of the social.“77 In this dimension, to put it plainly, the 
distinction between right/wrong, appropriate/inappropriate is translated into 
possible/impossible.  
In the broader field of Internet Governance Joel Reidenberg and 
Lawrence Lessig have made a similar argument already in the late 1990s:  
   
Law and government regulation are [. . .] not the on-
ly source of rule-making. Technological capabilities 
and system design choices impose rules on partici-
pants [. . .]; the set of rules for information flows im-
posed by technology and communication networks 
form a ‘lex informatica’.78 
 
For this perspective, Lawrence Lessig (1999) has coined the catch 
phrase “Code is Law”.79 That line of argument always runs the risk of fall-
ing into the trap of technological determinism, but integrated into an institu-
tional perspective it provides an instructive impulse into our thinking about 
how creatives work and products are regulated and framed.  
                                                                                                                       
77. John Law, Notes on the theory of the actor-network: Ordering, strategy, and hete-
rogeneity, 5 SYSTEMS PRACTICE , 379, 382 (1992). 
78. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formation of Information Policy Rules 
through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV., 553, 554 (1998). 
79. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
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Especially for copyright research, this dimension is of particular im-
portance. Digital Rights Management is an obvious example for the direct 
delegation of regulatory functions to the technological dimension. These 
systems try to translate strictly the legal/illegal distinction into possi-
ble/impossible actions on our devices and services – with sometimes frus-
trating and bewildering results. While DRM in the pay-per-download mar-
ket for music has been too inconvenient to succeed, it is today so tightly 
integrated into many services we use daily that we barely recognized them 
(e.g. streaming). Upload filtering technologies combined with IP rights da-
tabases such as YouTube’s ContentID similarly constitute ordering process-
es on the technological layer. Algorithms sift through every uploaded video 
and identify audio snippets that match items in their IP database. As a de-
fault, every match is a potential copyright infringement, notwithstanding 
possible fair use practices and other restrictions of copyright claims. In ef-
fect, these systems tend to overblock content by removing works that are 
not infringing at all.  
Turning to the case of imitation and innovation in games production, 
this dimension addresses the technological infrastructure of game develop-
ment. Programmers and graphic artists routinely use software and pro-
gramming environment that provides huge libraries and modules helping to 
build the game. No new game is technically built from scratch. In effect, the 
specific degree of imitation and innovation is strongly dependent on the 
technologies and their affordances. Level-design, game engine, as well as 
the control of the game character are regularly adopted from existing games, 
not only the concepts but also the implementation.  
In sum, the technological layer is one dimension where the govern-
ance of creative production and consumption is situated. Like other institu-
tional elements, it does not determine practices, but enables, constrains, and 
nudges people into one direction and rather hides alternatives. 
 
V. A MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE COPYRIGHT RESEARCH  
 
A.  Comparing Modes of Governance within a Sector 
 
In analytically distinguishing different modes, discussing their interplay 
sometimes gets neglected. The key analytical and empirical value of the 
proposed governance is exactly to investigate the relation between these 
dimension and their respective effects. The actual relation between laws, 
norms, discourses and possibly technological affordances in a specific con-
text is an empirical question that is amenable to research.  
Turning to our case study on game production, I have already highlight-
ed several differences in the evaluation of game design practices in chapter 
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IV. In the following table (see Table 2), I summarise and compare this eval-
uations across the four dimensions and two practices: re-skinning and ret-
ro/hommage games.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Regulative Normative Discursive Technology 
Re-Skinning No infringement Objectionable Practice 
Not considered 
creative work 
Re-engineer the 
product with new 
code and ele-
ments 
Hommage/Retro 
Infringing use of 
graphics and 
sounds 
If creative  
remake,  
then legitimate 
Creative work Re-use of ele-ments  
 
Table 2: Comparative Evaluation of Game Design Practices (white 
box: considered legitimate practice; dark box: considered illegitimate prac-
tice) 
 
As mentioned, re-skinning refers to re-producing a (often succesful) 
game by copying the logic and mechanics of a game and only changing the 
art style. From a legal perspective, this is in most cases a non-infringing 
practice. As long as graphics and sounds are substiantially altered, and the 
software code is re-written, this does not violate copyright or other legal 
provisions. On the contrary, the normative evaluation within the game de-
sign community strongly objects this practice. Looking at re-skinning from 
the discursive perspective, this is not only considered a normatively objec-
tionable practice, game designers more fundamentally refrain from qualify-
ing this a creative practice in the first place. From a technological perspec-
tive, re-skinning is not effortless because all material elements (graphics, 
sounds, software code) need to be redone, in order not to infringe upon the 
original.  
A contrasting case is the production of hommage or retro games. Popu-
lar especially in the context of indepent developers is the production of 
games that allude to iconic games, oftenly from the 1980ies or 1990ies, 
such as Super Mario Brothers. Typically game designers take the characters 
and maybe soundbits from these old games, and produce new games with a 
different game-play and narrative. From a legal perspective this regularly 
constitutes copyright infringement, since developers include the original, 
thus protected characters or very close adaption, they integrate iconical 
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graphic elements or soundbits. Yet, from the developer community’s nor-
mative point of view, this does not violate community norms as long as the 
game constitutes a creative remake of the original, eg. by performing a gen-
der-swap of the main characters or giving the game a different twist in game 
play. 
These short examples illustrate the analytical and empirical value of this 
model. Depending on the object of study, the four governance dimensions 
afford and support different creative and economic practices – and in many 
cases, they are not congruent. Regulative provisions diverge with normative 
assumptions in a community, public discourse is at struggle with practices 
enabled—and maybe even nudged—by new technologies. This is not only 
the case with game designers as presented. The same is true for the mis-
matches identified by Jessica Silbey,80 and also for the community norms in 
low IP regimes. Similarly to the game designers, both French chefs and 
comedians seems to value greatly the underlying idea of their creative work. 
Thus, the informal ownership claim put forward by creatives in these sec-
tors encompasses game play and mechanics (game designers), the combina-
tion and preparation of ingredients (French chefs) and the core structure of a 
routine and joke (comedians) – elements that are typically not protected by 
copyright as they are considered ideas rather than works. The analytical 
framework presented here thus allows us to identify these mismatches and 
to discuss possible reactions, if necessary. 
 
 
B.  Comparing Modes of Governance across Sectors 
 
This model also allows copyright and IP scholars to compare modes of 
governance across sectors. In the discussion of low IP regimes and other 
sectors we have seen that the impact and salience of different modes of 
governance varies: In the case of French chef and comedians, for example, 
informal norms appear as the main governance mode. In game design, 
norms have emerged as a relevant mode as well, but regulative, discursive 
and technological aspects also contribute to the ordering of creative practic-
es. In other sectors, copyright legislation and licensing contracts might well 
determine strongly creative practices and outputs. 
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 Regulative Normative Discursive Technology 
Sector A     
Sector B     
Sector C     
 
Table 3: Comparative Assessment of Governance Modes across Sec-
tors (black box: strong impact; grey: average impact; white: weak impact) 
 
 The schematized comparison of sectors in Table 3 illustrates the an-
alytical value of the presented governance model. Prevalent copyright re-
search presumes a strong impact of law, ideally incentivizing innovation—
and then concludes, allegedly with surprise, that “IP is not working as it 
should”81 or that some sectors represent a “negative space of IP”.82 This is 
because copyright researchers tend to focus on law and other legal instru-
ments, but in the context of the presented model this is but one dimension. 
In consequence, the model allows us to comparetively address the respec-
tive impact of different governance modes: regulation, norms, discourses, 
technology. It turns the assumption of copyright and IP scholarship and 
policy (that IP (a) has impact on creative practices and (b) incentivizes in-
novation) into an empirical question:83 What is the impact of IP on creative 
practices in relation to norms, discourses and technology? Does it hinder or 
promote innovation? And what is considered innovation in the first place? 
Only by bringing different modes of governance into relation, instead of 
isolating regulative means, we start to fully understand the interaction be-
tween creative practices.  
  
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 
This paper has set out to develop a multimodal concept of copyright 
governance. In a nutshell, it elaborates the point that there is always more 
than law in controlling IP – not only in low IP regimes. Building on institu-
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83. Cf. Burk, supra note 2, at 452, and Silbey, supra note 42, at 347. 
26  [Vol. XX 
tional theories, I suggest four modes of copyright governance: (1) A regula-
tive dimension, addressing the provision and enforcement of formal rules 
such as laws, court decisions, terms of services; (2) a normative dimension, 
investigating the prevalent assumptions about legitimate and illegitimate 
behavior in a specific community or sector; (3) a discursive dimension, ad-
dressing the framings and debates on creativity, authorship and originality; 
and (4) a technological dimension that investigates the embodiment of af-
fordances and rules in infrastructures, devices, and algorithms relevant to 
creative work. 
In analytically distinguishing different modes, discussing their inter-
play sometimes gets neglected. But that is exactly the core idea of this gov-
ernance model: ordering takes places when these dimensions reinforce each 
other, but also when they contest each other. Especially in the context of 
copyright, divergence between these dimensions has been obvious in recent 
years. Technologies strongly nudge users towards infringing behaviors, 
norms prevalent in many communities do not fit well the formal IP regula-
tions, etc.  
The illustrative case study on imitation and innovation in games 
production similarly has shown incongruences between the dimensions. 
Whereas legal regulation allows re-skinning of games, developers consider 
that as bad and objectionable practice.  
The empirical value of this model is that it allows comparative ap-
proaches. It allows to compare the empirical impact and specific effects of 
the respective dimensions within one sector, but also across sectors. From 
this perspective, the prominent low IP sectors can be characterized by a low 
level of formal IP regulation but a high level of informal normative expecta-
tions. The governance of content on online platforms, such as YouTube or 
Facebook, constitutes a promising example for future case studies. On the 
regulative dimension, we might expect a shift from public law to contractu-
al elements such as Terms of Service and Community Guidelines. Similar-
ly, we seem to experience a shift towards regulation on the technological 
dimension given the massive amount of content that these platforms host 
and the increasing political pressure for taking accountability for this con-
tent. In consequence, the platforms implement filtering mechanisms.  
I hope to stimulate the discussion on theoretical aspects of interdis-
ciplinary copyright research with this paper. The literature on low IP re-
gimes has given many impulses for extending our understanding of how 
creative work is ordered and framed. This paper tries to develop this line of 
thinking into a coherent framework that integrates diverse modes of order-
ing – without privileging one over the other. The specific impact of the re-
spective modes is an empirical question. I hope the copyright governance 
model put forward here can contribute to answering this question. 
